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Sticks and Stones: Homosexual
Solicitations and the Fighting Words Doctrine
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Phipps,' upholding
Ohio's same-sex solicitation statute, Ohio Revised Code section
2907.07(B), 2 exemplifies the dangers of creating exceptions to the first
amendment 3 protection of speech. The majority of the court there
demonstrated, by its inartful perversion of the fighting words doctrine,
that such exceptions can open the door to government abuse, discrimina-
tion, and censorship, and that the court cannot be relied upon to protect
the first amendment rights of those who are the objects of both the
legislature's and the courts' ignorance and prejudice.
In order to cure the overbreadth of the Ohio importuning statute, the
court attempted to construe it to apply only to fighting words,4 one of the
few types of speech excepted from first amendment protection. The court
also found that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.5
This Case Comment will analyze the Ohio Supreme Court's
application of the fighting words doctrine in the Phipps case. To provide
background for this discussion, a brief explication of the constitutional
doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth will be included. Finally, it will be
argued that the fighting words doctrine is inapplicable to homosexual
solicitation.
I. THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF PHIPPS
At 2:15 A.M. on October 27, 1976, Kenneth Phipps stopped his car
next to the curb of a street corner in downtown Cincinnati.6 He rolled
down his car window and motioned for the only person in the immediate
vicinity to approach him. When that person, an adult male police officer in
civilian dress,8 complied, Phipps said, "Hop in, let's go have sex."9 The
officer appeared hesitant after looking into the back seat of the car, which
prompted Phipps to say, "You look paranoid, come on in, I want to suck
1. 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (1979).
2. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.07(B) (Page 1975). The statute provides: "No person shall solicit
a person of the same sex to engage in sexual activity with the offender, when the offender knows such
solicitation is offensive to the other person, or is reckless in that regard."
3. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . U.S. CONSr.
amend. I. The first amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. It
provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 278, 389 N.E.2d at 1133.
5. Id. at 273, 389 N.E.2d at 1130.
6. Id. at 271, 389 N.E.2d at 1130.
7. Record at 8.
8. Record at 10. The officer was assigned to the Vice Department of the Cincinnati Police
Department and was on duty at the time of the arrest. Id. at 7. The officer testified that he was offended.
Id. at 9.
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your dick."10 At that point, the officer entered the vehicle" and Phipps
made the same or a similar proposal. 12 He also told the officer that he was
"handsome," "beautiful," and that he "really liked" him. 13 The officer then
identified himself and placed Phipps under arrest.1
4
Based upon the preceding facts, Phipps was convicted by the
Hamilton County Municipal Court 5 of importuning in violation of Ohio
Revised Code section 2907.07(B). His conviction on appeal was reversed.
The Hamilton County Court of Appeals held that the importuning statute
was overbroad, thus restricting speech protected by the first amendment.
6
The court of appeals found the statute overbroad for two reasons: first, it
did not proscribe speech that is unprotected by the first amendment; and
second, it did proscribe protected speech in the absence of a compelling
state interest for doing so.'
7
The court of appeals, in its search for a compelling state interest that
would justify the creation of a new category of unprotected speech,
considered two possibilities: an interest in prevention of homosexual
activity, and an interest in prevention of offensive language.18 It held that
because Ohio law does not prohibit homosexual acts in private between
consenting adults, "reason and consistency say that [consenting adults
regardless of sexual preference] should be allowed to communicate with
each other in order to determine whether or not both consent."'19 The
court of appeals stated that "[o]ffensive language alone, however
discordant with widely accepted values, is not subject to governmental
regulation. 20 It also found no constitutional precedent holding that
discussion of sexual matters is subject to greater government regulation
than other types of speech.2'
The court of appeals also found the statute to be unconstitutionally
vague because it fails to give adequate notice of the conduct proscribed.2
The court stated that the statute as written is vague because it makes a
solicitation criminal based on the addressee's reaction 23 and because the
9. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 271, 389 N.E.2d at 1130.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Record at 10-11.
14. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 271, 389 N.E.2d at 1130.
15. Id.
16. State v. Phipps, No. C-76886 at 3 (Hamilton County Ct. App. March 28, 1978).
17. Id. at 6.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id., quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971).
21. State v. Phipps, No. C-76886 at 6 (Hamilton County Ct. App. March 28, 1978).
22. Id. at 8. But see the dissent by Judge Palmer, in which he finds that the statute affords
adequate notice, id. at 11-16. Judge Palmer also found that the statute proscribed conduct and not
speech, id. at 16-24, and that the state's interest in regulating such conduct was to protect the
addressee's right of privacy, id. at 24-27.
23. Id. at 7-8.
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test for offensiveness is not limited to a reasonable person standard. Even if
a reasonable person standard were applied, the court observed, "the
diversity and unpredictability of human sexual responses are such that the
probability of accurate preduction about the offensiveness of homosexual
advances is too uncertain to provide a firm foundation for a standard of
criminal conduct. 24 In addition the court specifically held that Phipps'
language was not fighting words.25
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed.26 Relying on dictionary and
statutory definitions of the operative words, 27 the court found Ohio
Revised Code section 2907.07(B) "clearly and precisely written" and
therefore not void for vagueness.28
The court did find the statute to be unconstitutionally overbroad2 9 In
reaching this determination, it rejected the state's argument that the statute
regulates conduct rather than speech.3° It found, however, no state interest
sufficiently compelling to allow regulation of homosexual solicitations.
These solicitations, the court observed, do not represent "a substantial evil
that arises far above public inconvenience, annoyance and unrest. ' 31 The
court also detected no privacy interest sufficient to uphold the statute,
noting that "the special plight of the captive audience is not involved. 32
Unable to find a compelling reason to uphold the statute,33 the court
determined that it could not allow the statute to stand unless it prohibited
only constitutionally unprotected speech. 34 The court, therefore, con-
strued Ohio Revised Code section 2907.07(B) narrowly to make it
applicable only to fighting words.35 As will be shown below, the court did
considerable damage to the first amendment in reaching this result.
In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice Sweeney agreed that the statute is
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 4.
26. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 280, 389 N.E.2d at 1134.
27. Id. at 273-275, 389 N.E.2d at 1130-31.
28. Id. at 274, 389 N.E.2d at 1131.
29. Id. at 278, 389 N.E.2d at 1133.
30. Id. at 276, 389 N.E.2d at 1132. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court indicated that a less rigorous overbreadth test would be used in analyzing
statutes primarily affecting conduct. One commentator has noted, however, that this merely suggests
"that expressive conduct falls outside the protection of the first amendment more frequently than does
speech; it does not indicate essential differences between speech and constitutionally protected
conduct." See Note, First Amendment Vagueness and Overbreadth: Theoretical Revisions by the
Burger Court, 31 VAND. L.R. 609, 614-15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Vagueness and Overbreadth].
This being true, the court's finding that the statute regulated speech and not conduct should have no
significant impact on the outcome of the case. See also L. TRIBE, ANIERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §
12-7 at 598-601 (1978).
3!. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 277,389 N.E.2d at 1133. It is necessary to show that there is a compelling
state interest in the regulation of speech in order for the regulation to be lawful, unless the speech falls
into one of the categories excepted from first amendment protection. L. TRIBE supra note 30, § 12-8 at
602.
32. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 277-78,389 N.E.2d at 1133, quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at2l-22.
33. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 278, 389 N.E.2d at 1133.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 280, 389 N.E.2d at 1134.
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overbroad.36 He found, however, that the majority's attempt to narrow it
to apply only to fighting words was really "a vehicle for salvaging
constitutionally deficient legislation. 37 Justice Sweeney observed that the
majority had failed to recognize the "long-standing distinction between
fighting words and merely offensive speech" in its attempt to fit sexual
solicitations into the definition of fighting words.38 He would have affirmed
the court of appeals decision.39
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES APPLIED IN PHIPPS
In reaching its decision in Phipps, the Ohio Supreme Court
considered challenges to Ohio Revised Code section 2907.07(B) based on
three constitutional doctrines: vagueness, overbreadth and fighting words.
Although the focus of this Case Comment is the fighting words doctrine as
applied in Phipps, a brief description of the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines follows to provide a foundation for the subsequent discussion of
their application in Phipps. A detailed analysis of the fighting words
doctrine is then presented. It will develop the historical background of the
doctrine and analyze the changes it has undergone to the present day.
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines have traditionally been
viewed as similar, if not identical, and originally were treated as equivalent
in their applications to first amendment cases.40 As time has passed the
distinctions between the two doctrines have become more defined; yet
there is still significant interplay between them. 41 A statute is overbroad
when it prohibits constitutionally protected activity while attempting to
regulate unprotected activity.42 A statute is void for vagueness when it fails
to give adequate notice of the prohibited activity, thus depriving those
subject to the statute of their right to procedural due process.43 Statutes
that are vague and/or overbroad are subject to stringent constitutional
analysis because of their potential application to protected conduct, and
because they may inhibit constitutionally protected activity. This is often
referred to as the "chilling" effect.44 For this reason, the existence of the
statute is as harmful as its enforcement. In addition, statutes found to be
vague or overbroad are disfavored because they leave too much to the
discretion of the police and the judiciary.45 Due to these considerations
37. Id. at 281, 389 N.E.2d at 1135.
38. Id. at 280, 389 N.E.2d at 1135.
39. Id. at 281, 389 N.E.2d at 1135.
40. See generally Vagueness and Overbreadth, supra note 30, at 609.
41. L. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-26 at 716; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 722 (1978); Vagueness and Overbreadth, supra note 30, at 611.
42. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
43. Conally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
44. See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
45. Id. at 108-09.
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underlying first amendment protection, a litigant may challenge a statute
as vague or overbroad as it is applied to his own conduct or as overbroad
regardless of its application of his particular activity. 6
1. Vagueness Doctrine
The generally accepted formulation of the vagueness doctrine is
derived from Connolly v. General Construction Co., 47 in which the United
States Supreme Court stated that a statute is void for vagueness if it
"forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application., 48 A vague statute is subject to several possible infirmities.
It may give inadequate notice of proscribed conduct,49 or it may provide
insufficient guidelines for enforcement,50 or it may result in a "chilling" of,
first amendment rights.51 While the "chilling" effect is frequently the basis
of challenges involving first amendment rights, inadequate notice or
insufficient guidelines for enforcement may be applicable in such cases. 2
It may be impossible to draft a statute without some element of
vagueness, and no requirement of absolute clarity has ever been imposed
upon legislators. 3 Yet in cases involving first amendment rights a greater
degree of facial clarity is required.54 This stricter standard of clarity is
required not only because of potential infringement of the right of notice
and the right to be free from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
the laws, but also because of the high value placed on freedom of speech.55
46. See Vagueness and Overbreadth, supra note 30, at 610-11.
47. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
48. Id. at 391.
49. Id.
50. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
51. See text accompanying note 44 supra. See also Note, The Void-For- Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67, 75-76 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Void-For-Vagueness
Doctrine]; Note, Disorderly Conduct and Loitering-A Modern Approach to Traditional Legislation,
30 ARK. L. REv. 186, 205-07 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Disorderly Conduct]; Vagueness and
Overbreadth, supra note 30, at 610.
52. Disorderly Conduct, supra note 52, at 199-202. L. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-28 at619 notes
that chilling effect can result from inadequate notice or insufficient guidelines for enforcement; but it
can also result from notice that is overly sufficient.
53. The difficulty of legislative drafting often has been recognized by the Court. See, e.g., Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159-60 (1974). See also Vagueness and Overbreadth, supra note 30, at 626-
27.
54. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573. The formulation for the degree of facial clarity has never
firmly been established; it is necessary, however, that a statute be drawn as narrowly as practicable.
Those standards that have been set forth provide "only limited guidance and may be manipulated
considerably." Vagueness and Overbreadth, supra note 30, at 627. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 30, §
12-28 at 719.
55. Because of the high value placed on free speech, the courts had allowed third party claims to.
be used as the basis for a vagueness challenge where speech was involved. E.g., Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507,509 (1948). In such instances a vagueness challenge could successfully be asserted without
regard to its applicability to the litigant's specific conduct. More recently, however, the requirements
for a successful challenge on the basis of vagueness have been modified. Now it must be shown that the
challenged statute is vague in its application to the challenger's conduct. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
756 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974). In order to have standing to raise the issue of
vagueness, the challenging party must allege that the statute is vague as applied to everyone, including
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:553
2. Overbreadth Doctrine
A statute is overbroad when it proscribes constitutionally protected
activity in its attempt to prohibit unprotected acts 6 Although many laws
have some potential applicability to constitutionally protected conduct,57
this alone is not sufficient to invalidate their enforcement except as applied
to protected activity.5
8
A statute that has as its general focus the regulation of conduct that,
merely by circumstance and without marked regularity, includes speech
will not be struck down as overbroad simply because it occasionally may
be applied to protected first amendment activity. Such a law can remain in
effect while unconstitutional applications are determined on a case-by-case
basis. 9 If a statute significantly infringes protected first amendment
activity, however, the potential chilling effect is deemed too great a risk to
allow the slow process of case-by-case determination to establish the
proper scope of the statute.: Thus, when first amendment rights are
involved, an overbroad statute is void until it is rewritten or narrowly
construed to avoid infringement of protected speech.'
B. Fighting Words Doctrine
The first amendment guarantees freedom from government cen-
sorship of speech. 2 Although the language of the amendment seems to
make this protection absolute, certain categories of speech have been
recognized as being beyond its shelter.63 The fighting words doctrine is one
of those exceptions. As originally defined by the United States Supreme
Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 4 fighting words were those words
him, or he may allege that although the statute may be constitutionally applicable to some conduct, it is
not so applicable in respect to the facts of his particular case. L. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-29 at 720-21;
Vagueness and Overbreadth, supra note 30, at 629-35.
56. For an example of a statute that has been found overbroad, see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 91-92 (1940). See L. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-24 at710-12, § 12-25 at 712-14, for a discussion
of the characteristics of overbroad statutes.
57. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (Jehovah's Witnesses were allowed to distribute
religious literature on the streets of a company town despite an otherwise enforceable trespass statute).
See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
58. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 509.
59. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,615-16 (1973). (A statutes overbreadth may be"cured
through case-by-case analysis.")
60. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965). Moreover, the Court noted that
"[t]he chilling effect upon the exercise of first amendment rights may derive from the fact of the
prosecution, unaffected by the prospect of its success or failure." Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
61. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972).
62. See note 3 supra.
63. "These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or'fighting7
words." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
64. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The forerunner of the fighting words doctrine is Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In that case, Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness, was soliciting funds for
his church. As a part of the solicitation he played a recording that contained an attack on organized
religion, particularly the Catholic Church. Cantwell played this recording for two Catholic men who
were "highly offended." Cantwell was charged with the common law offense of breach of the peace. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed Cantwelrs conviction, noting that one might be
1980] HOMOSEXUAL SOLICITATIONS & FIGHTING WORDS 559
"which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. 65
In Chaplinsky, the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, had been
preaching in the streets. When a disturbance arose Chaplinsky was
escorted to the police station by an officer.66 On the way they met another
officer, to whom Chaplinsky said" 'You are a God damned racketeer and a
damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or
agents of Fascists.' ,67 Chaplinsky was convicted under a statute
proscribing "offensive, derisive or annoying" language in public.6 8 On
appeal from that conviction the United States Supreme Court held that the
statute had been brought within constitutional guidelines by the narrowing
construction given it by the New Hampshire courts, which had declared
that it applies only when the language has a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the persons to whom it is addressed.69 Although the
construction of the New Hampshire courts clearly was limited to
preventing a breach of the peace,70 the United States Supreme Court gave a
much broader scope to the fighting words exception to the first
amendment:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting words"-those which by their very
guilty of a breach of the peace "if he commit acts or make statements likely to provoke violence and
disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality be intended." Id. at 309. The Court found
"no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal
abuse," id. at 310, and no breach of the peace. This case, however, did not present a pure speech issue
because Cantwell's conduct was in the furtherance of his religious beliefs. The Court's decision
therefore balanced not only the speech interest but also that of religious freedom against the state's
interest in preserving the peace. Id. at 307. Also, the case did not present a pure fighting words issue
since the offensive language was not part of a face-to-face confrontation and the listeners had given
their consent to hear the recording.
65. 315 U.S. at 569.
66. Id. at 570. It is unclear whether Chaplinsky was under arrest at that time.
67. Id. at 569. Chaplinsky stated that his remark was in response to a curse by the officer. The
trial court, however, found that neither provocation nor the truth of the remarks were a defense. Id. at
570.
68. Id. at 569.
69. Id. at 573. The state's construction is as follows:
"The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee
thinks . . . . The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be
words likely to cause an average addressee to fight . . . . The English language has a
number of words and expressions which by general consent are 'fighting words' when said
without a disarming smile . . . . Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a
fight. So are threatening, profane or obscene revelings. Derisive and annoying words can be
taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they
have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the
peace . . . . The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words
plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking
constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker-including'classical fighting words,' words in
current use less 'classical' but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words,
including profanity, obscenity and threats." (footnote omitted).
Quoted at 315 U.S. at 573.
70. 315 U.S. at 573.
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utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.71
The court adopted this expansive definition of fighting words from
Professor Zechariah Chafee's Free Speech in the United States.72 The state
had limited its definition to include only those words "plainly tending to
excite the addressee to a breach of the peace, 73 but the United States
Supreme Court's definition included words that cause injury by their mere
utterance. Despite this broadened definition, the statute as construed and
the facts of the case were concerned only with words likely to cause a
breach of the peace.
From the Chaplinsky definition of fighting words, three factors can be
identified as underlying the fighting words doctrine: (1) the behavioral
assumption that words can trigger the average person to react With
immediate violence, (2) the value of speech determines in part the level of
constitutional protection it deserves, and (3) the state interests in
preserving the peace and protecting citizens' sensibilities warrant the
prohibition of speech in some circumstances. 74 The following sections will
examine how the Court's evaluation of these factors has changed since
Chaplinsky so as to narrow the fighting words exception.
1. The Behavioral Assumption of the
Fighting Words Doctrine
The court in Chaplinsky accepted as one form of fighting words75
those that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 76 This
definition implies that there is an unavoidable relationship between the
utterance of certain offensive words in a face-to-face confrontation and a
violent response on the part of the addressee. The acceptance of this
behavioral theory allows the Court to avoid consideration of whether the
anticipated breach of the peace could be avoided by further communica-
tion. Otherwise, the government would have to prove that the prohibition
of "fighting words" prevented a harm that could not be stopped by a
further exchange of ideas.77 This behavioral assumption also assumes that
there is no less restrictive means available to the state for preventing the
71. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
72. Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
73. See note 69 supra.
74. See generally Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment
Protection, 9 HARV. Civ. R.L. REv. 1, 5-9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Offensive Language].
75. The other form being words that "by their very utterance inflict injury." 315 U.S. at 572.
76. Id.
77. Whenever a further exchange of ideas can avoid an expected harm, the government cannot
justify the prohibition of the speech since prohibition would not be the least restrictive means of
protecting the state's interest. L. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-8 at 602-03.
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violent response."5 Clearly, this behavioral assumption allows the
proscription of certain speech with minimal justification by the
government. The behavioral assumption doctrine has undergone little
change since Chaplinsky. The fighting words "uncontrollable impulse"
theory has never been applied by the United States Supreme Court unless
the case involved an individual face-to-face confrontation. In Terminiello
v. Chicago79 the Court addressed the issue of speech that causes violent
reactions when addressed to a crowd. The Court never reached the
question whether such speech constitutes fighting words under the
uncontrollable impulse theory.80 Instead it stated that speech to an
audience is protected "unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."8' In Cohen v. California82 the
words "Fuck the Draft," worn on a jacket, were found not to be fighting
words because they were not directed to any particular individual.83 The
Court also found that Cohen's "speech" could not be prohibited because of
the state's fear that violence would result, in the absence of evidence that
such a result was likely.84 In Hess v. Indiana,8 offensive language not
personally directed to an individual was also held not to be fighting words.
Personal affront thus continues to be a requirement before the behavioral
assumption doctrine applied.
The uncontrollable impulse theory of behavior remains at the heart of
the fighting words doctrine. 86 The Court has consistently held that the
fighting words exception to first amendment protection must be narrowly
construed, 7 yet it has not required proof that the words led to a violent
reaction. Although in Chaplinsky the Court established that the
behavioral assumption of an uncontrollable impulse was to be based on
the likely reaction of an average addressee,88 it has not as yet called for
evidence of what would be an average response. This absence of any
78. Offensive Language, supra note 74, at 9.
79. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). A suspended Catholic priest made a race-baiting speech that resulted in
protests and violence from the crowd.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 4.
82. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
83. Id. at 20.
84. Id. at 23.
85. 414 U.S. 105 (1973). With his back to a police officer, Hess said "[w]e'll take thefucking street
later." Id. at 107.
86. Without this assumption there would be no reasonable basis for the proscription ofspeech. If
the addressee could control his reaction and simply choose not to fight, then he, rather than the
speaker, should be subject to criminal sanctions. The government can justify the proscription of speech
only if there is no less restrictive means available of serving a legitimate government interest. J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 727.
87. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 571. The Court found fighting words to be one of
the "well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" exempt from constitutional protection. The
cases discussed herein demonstrate that the Court has continued to construe fighting words narrowly.
88. Id. at 573. See note 69 supra.
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requirement of proof concerning the average response allows the judiciary
to take judicial notice of what constitutes fighting words, just as the Court
did in Chaplinsky.89 This is a serious flaw in the fighting words doctrine
because, without evidence upon which to base its decision, the Court may
find its own prejudices dictating what will be considered fighting words.90
2. The Value of Speech and Application
of Fighting Words Doctrine
The Court in Chaplinsky said that only speech that communicates
information ("idea speech") deserves constitutional protection. This
reasoning followed that of Justice Holmes in a dissent written many years
before which declared that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas." 9' Offensive speech, such as fighting words, was found
in Chaplinsky not to be "in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution. 92 Once the
Court had determined that fighting words had little or no value, it had little
difficulty in allowing their proscription.
Several years later the Court began to erode the Chaplinsky concept
that the first amendment protects only the "idea speech." In Winters v.
New York93 the Court found that magazines containing "nothing of any
possible value to society" nevertheless are entitled to constitutional
protection.94 It noted that "[w]hat is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine. 95 The Court thus added the entertainment value of
speech as a rationale for first amendment protection. Libel in the form of
good faith intentional criticism of government officials is no longer outside
first amendment protection following the decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan.96 This is a significant expansion of the Chaplinsky concept of
protected speech since it recognizes that even an untruth can have sufficient
value to merit constitutional protection. In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council,97 commercial speech gained the
shelter of first amendment protection.98
The emotive value of speech was acknowledged in Cohen v.
California.99 Addressing the issue of the state's right to prohibit speech in
89. 315 U.S. at 574. The Court stated: "Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the
appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person
to retaliation, and thereby cause a breech of the peace." See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 20.
90. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
91. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
92. 315 U.S. at 572.
93. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
94. Id. at 510. The Court refused to find "that the constitutional protection for a free press
applies only to the exposition of ideas." Id.
95. Id.
96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
97. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
98. The protection, however, is not absolute. 425 U.S. at 770-73.
99. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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order that a palatable level of discourse be maintained, the Court stated
that "words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force."100 Thus, any misconception that constitutional protection does not
extend to the emotive function of speech "which, practically speaking, may
often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be
communicated,"' 0'1 was laid to rest.
This post-Chaplinsky expansion of the types of speech that are
constitutionally protected means that courts must now examine the
circumstances surrounding the use of language. This is a marked difference
in approach from the Chaplinsky court, which recognized a static class of
near zero value speech that could always be fighting words. 102 In Cohen the
Court acknowledged that the four-letter word displayed on Cohen's jacket
could easily be used as a fighting word0 3 but said that when it is used to
convey a political message and/or is not directed to an individual as a
personally abusive epithet, it is not a fighting word.10 4 The circumstances
of a word's use determine its value and therefore the level of constitutional
protection its user will receive. In Hess'0 5 the Court stated, in reference to
the same four-letter word used in Cohen, that even if under other
circumstances the speech could be regarded as fighting words, it could not
be so considered when it had not been directed to anyone in particular. The
one circumstance that consistently has been required for fighting words is
that they be personally abusive epithets addressed to an individual.
Chaplinsky, which involved a face-to-face confrontation replete with
name-calling, is the only fighting words conviction that has been upheld by
the United States Supreme Court. 0 6 Other cases in which fighting words
convictions have not been upheld often cite the lack of a personally
insulting confrontation as the reason.
0 7
The expanded concept of the value of speech that has developed in the
thirty-eight years since Chaplinsky, combined with the requirement that
the circumstances surrounding the use of the language in question be
considered before a value is placed on the speech, make it clear that the
fighting words doctrine is to be used cautiously and applied narrowly.' 8
Speech is held to fall outside first amendment protection as fighting words
only when it is used in a personally abusive manner in a face-to-face
confrontation between individuals. This narrowed applicability of the
100. Id. at 26.
101. Id.
102. 315 U.S. at 572,573. In Chaplinsky the Court observed that, "[tihe English language has a
number of words and expressions which by general consent are 'fighting words' when said without a
disarming smile." Id. at 573.
103. 403 U.S. at 20.
104. Id. at 18-20.
105. 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973).
106. 315 U.S. 15 (1941).
107. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
108. This policy is set forth in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972).
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fighting words doctrine is appropriate in light of the constitutional
mandate against the infringement of free speech. 09
3. State Interests That Justify
the Fighting Words Doctrine
The definition of fighting words in Chaplinsky identifies two potential
harms that serve as justification for the proscription of such speech: first,
injury to the sensibilities; and second, the threat of an immediate breach of
the peace. 10 The identification of these two harms anticipates two possible
reactions by the addressees of the fighting words.'
a. The Sensibilities Interest
The state's interest in preventing injury to the sensibilities of citizens is
based on the idea that people have a right to internal emotional order,'1
2
analogous to the right not to be assaulted physically. The state's interest
in protecting sensibilities should arise only in situations in which further
speech is unlikely to repair the harm." 3 Although the interest in protect-
ing sensibilities was included in the Chaplinsky definition of fighting
words, the facts of the case and the Court's decision did not rely on this in-
terest.
1 4
Attempting to protect people's sensibilities through the machinery of
law presents difficult problems of proof. Emotional upset may not be
visible even at the time it occurs. Providing evidence of injury often would
be nearly impossible. With no outward measure of harm, enforcement of a
law to protect sensibilities must rely heavily on the testimony of the injured
party. The potential for abuse in the form of malicious prosecution or on
the basis of simple differences in the degree of each person's sensitivities is
109. See note 3 supra.
110. 315 U.S. at 572.
111. The Court cited Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (1941) as the source for
the fighting words definition. Chafee provided a general discussion of offensive speech. He did not draw
clear lines between obscenity, profanity and gross libels, nor did he mention a separate class of
language known as fighting words. Rather, he considered "insults . . . . liable to provoke a fight" one
example of obscenity, profanity and/or gross libel. Id. at 150. He considered all such language to be of
the same ilk and subject to the same proscription. Chafee warned against creating new categories of
verbal crimes. He observed the difficulty of establishing clear tests for such crimes and stated that:
"When the law supplies no definite standard of criminality, ajudge ...may consciously disregard
the sound test of present injury, and ... condemn the defendant because his words express ideas
which are thought liable to cause bad future consequences." Id. Chafee concludes with the warning
that, "all these crimes of injurious words must be kept within very narrow limits if they are not to give
excessive opportunities for outlawing heterodox ideas." Id. at 152. Itis unfortunate that Chafee's work
should have been instrumental in the creation of a new exception to the first amendment protection of
speech. It is even more unfortunate that the fighting words doctrine is subject to all the frailties that
Chafee warned against.
112. Offensive Language, supra note 74, at 7.
113. See L. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-8 at 606.
114. 315 U.S. at 574.
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clear." 5 In addition, the extreme difficulty of predicting what will offend
another person's sensibilities presents serious notice problems.'
16
It was not until 1969, twenty-seven years after Chaplinsky, that the
Court again addressed the sensibilities issue in Street v. New York.'
7
Although the Court found that Street's speech did not constitute fighting
words, it did recognize that the state had "an interest in protecting the
sensibilities of passers-by who might be shocked"' 8 by Street's words.
The Court declared, however, that "the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to
some of their hearers."' 19 This indicates that sensibilities can be protected
only from the manner in which ideas are expressed and not from the ideas
themselves.
In Cohen v. California120 fighting words were defined as "those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen
are as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent
reaction."' 2' The sensibilities interest was completely omitted from the
discussion of the fighting words doctrine, despite a citation to
Chaplinsky.122 The Court also limited the validity of the sensibilities
interest as a basis for the proscription of offensive speech. Only if
substantial privacy interests are seriously invaded in a manner that does
not allow the unwilling observer to turn away, the Court said, will offensive
discourse be prohibited in order to protect sensibilities.1
In Gooding v. Wilson, 24 the Court's explanation of the fighting words
doctrine impliedly rejected the sensibilities interest as a basis for the
prohibition of speech. The Court rejected the Chaplinsky definition of
fighting words and instead cited the New Hampshire court's definition,
125
which applied the doctrine only to prevent a breach of the peace. In
Gooding, a Georgia statute that prohibited "opprobrious words or abusive
language, tending to cause a breach of the peace,"' 26 was found
overbroad.127 The prior decisions of Georgia courts128 construing the
115. See Offensive Language, supra note 74, at 7.
116. For a discussion of lack of notice and vagueness doctrine, see text accompanying note 55
supra.
117. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
118. Id. at 59 1. Street was burning an American flag in reaction to the shooting of a prominent
civil rights leader. While he was burning the flag he said, "We don't need no damn flag." Id. at 576.
119. Id. at 592.
120. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
121. Id. at 20.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 21.
124. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
125. Id. at 523.
126. Id. at 519.
127. Id.
128. Samuels v. State, 103 Ga. App. 66, 118 S.E. 2d 231(1961); Lyons v. State, 94 Ga. App. 570,
95 S.E.2d 478 (1956); Elmore v. State, 15 Ga. App. 461, 83 S.E. 799 (1914); Jackson v. State, 14 Ga.
App. 19, 80 S.E. 20 (1913); Fish v. State, 124 Ga. 416, 52 S.E. 737 (1905).
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statute had permitted the prohibition of speech that was merely harsh or
insulting, 129 which clearly was not within the narrow limits of the fighting
words doctrine. The Court referred to Chaplinsky a number of times, but
throughout the opinion it relied only on the state's interest in keeping the
peace to determine whether the Georgia statute was valid.130 This created a
strong implication that the sensibilities interest had been abandoned as a
part of the fighting words doctrine.
Several months after Gooding, three more cases based on offensive
language statutes came to the Court. These cases confirmed the
implication in Gooding that an affront to sensibilities no longer qualified
as fighting words.
In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey'31 the defendant used the term
"motherfucker" in a speech given at a public school board meeting. 32 He
was charged with disorderly conduct under a statute that had previously
been interpreted to prohibit language "of such a nature as to be likely to
incite the hearer to an immediate breach or to be likely . .. to affect the
sensibilities of a hearer."' 33 The majority vacated the conviction and
remanded without opinion for reconsideration in light of Gooding and
Cohen. Since New Jersey's prior interpretation of the statute was within
the guidelines of the Chaplinsky definition of fighting words, the Court
apparently remanded to eliminate the sensibilities aspect of the statute's
prior construction. 34 In his dissent, Justice Powell argued that the interest
in protecting sensibilities should remain part of the fighting words
doctrine.
35
In both Lewis v. New Orleans136 and Brown v. Oklahoma,137 broadly
worded offensive language statutes were at issue. 3 8 Neither statute had
been given a narrowing construction. Lewis was remanded for recon-
sideration in light of Gooding.139 Brown was remanded for reappraisal in
li&ht of both Gooding and Cohen.140 In both cases the language prohibited
129. 405 U.S. at 525.
130. Id. at 518, 522, 523, 524, 525, 528.
131. 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
132. Id. at 904.
133. Id.
134. On rehearing, the New Jersey Superior Court found the statute as previously construed to
be overbroad. It found that the Court's remand was based on the inclusion of the sensibilities interest in
the statute's interpretation. State v. Rosenfeld, 120 N.J. Super. 458,459-460, 295 A.2d 1, 2 (App. Div.
1972).
135. 408 U.S. at 905. Justice Powell was joined in his dissent by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice
Blackmun. Justice Rehnquist, in a separate dissent, did not discuss the sensibilities interest specifically,
although he felt that Rosenfeld's language should come within the Chaplinsky definition of fighting
words. Id. at 911.
136. 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
137. 408 U.S. 914 (1972).
138. The statute in Lewis proscribed the use of"obscene or opprobrious language toward or with
reference to any member of the city police." 408 U.S. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The statute in
Brown prohibited "obscene or lascivious language." 408 U.S. at 911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. 408 U.S. 913.
140. 408 U.S. 914.
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was not restricted to speech likely to provoke a violent response by the
addressee. 14 Since the Court's decision in Gooding, it consistently has
followed the pattern it set in Rosenfeld, Lewis, and Brown of vacating and
remanding cases involving offensive language statutes defined more
broadly than the statute approved in Chaplinsky.
142
The elimination of the state interest in protecting citizens' sensibilities
as a basis for the prohibition of speech under the fighting words doctrine1
43
indicates a more sensitive approach to the first amendment protection of
speech than was originally formulated in Chaplinsky. This new approach
eliminates the evidentiary problems associated with enforcement under the
old definition. 44 More importantly, it demonstrates the Court's recogni-
tion that government regulation and interference in interpersonal
communications is not a valid exercise of state police power.
b. The Interest in Preserving the Peace
The second interest recognized in the Chaplinsky concept of the
fighting words doctrine is the prevention of breaches of the peace. 145 The
state's interest in maintaining physical order is readily understandable.
The fighting words doctrine allows the proscription of speech that is
likely to or has a tendency to cause a breach of the peace. 46 This permits
the restraint of speech without any actual injury taking place. Because
speech can be prohibited before any breach of the peace occurs, the
decision that it has reached such a level that it has a tendency to cause a
breach of the peace lies first with the addressee of the language. This
judgment is then second-guessed by a police officer, who determines
whether a law has been violated.147 The final determination rests with the
court. Each of these decisions is based on subjective judgments. Proof is
extremely difficult. In some instances, an addressee may give a warning or
threaten violent response,148 but often there will be no evidence that a
141. See note 139 supra. On rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction in
Lewis, taking the position that the statute wvas narrow as written. New Orleans v. Lewis, 263 La. 809,
269 So. 2d 450 (1972). When the case reached the United States Supreme Court for the second time, the
Court again reversed. This time it found the statute facially void because it was not limited to words
likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace. 415 U.S. 130, 131 (1974). The conviction in Brown
was reversed on remand. Brown v. State, 503 P.2d 571 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
142. It should be remembered that the statute approved in Chaplinsky dealt only with
preventing breaches of the peace; it did not include any protection of the sensibilities interest. See note
70 supra. Cases remanded include Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974); Kelley v. Ohio, 416 U.S. 923
(1974); Rosen v. California, 416 U.S. 924 (1974); Karlan v. Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924 (1974); Carson v.
Columbus, 409 U.S. 1053 (1972).
143. The sensibilities interest has limited viability in cases in which other forms ofexpression are
involved. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974).
144. See text accompanying notes 115 and 116 supra.
145. 315 U.S. at 572.
146. Id.
147. In cases in which the addressee is a police officer, as in Phipps, one level of determination is
eliminated. This is the normal pattern in fighting words cases. With few exceptions, fighting words
cases involve speech either directed to or perceived by police officers as in Chaplinsky and Cohen.
148. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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breach of the peace was about to occur other than the judgment of the
addressee. This opens the door to abuses ranging from false prosecutions
to simple errors in judgment.
The most significant problem, however, is that a law based on a
subjective standard for evaluating the speech of others can be misused as a
tool for censoring ideas.149 In circumstances in which some actual violence
has occurred, problems of proof are only slightly simplified because it is
still necessary to determine that an average person would have reacted in a
like manner 5
When a statute applicable to fighting words is used as a means of
preserving the peace, the Court requires that the definition of breach of the
peace be narrow. 51 It cannot include protection of sensibilities, nor can it
be so broad that protected speech is curtailed on any other rationale.
152
In Gooding,153 an additional requirement was imposed: not only must
the words used be likely to elicit a violent response in an average addressee,
but in the actual addressees as well. 54 Prior to Gooding,'55 lower courts
had interpreted the fighting words rationale to apply even where the ad-
dressee was "locked in a prison cell or on the opposite bank of an impas-
sable torrent."'' 56 In Gooding the Court held that this interpretation is
incorrect.
The Court's requirement in Gooding that a violent reaction must have
been a real possibility is not limited to the situation in which a physical
barrier separates the speaker and the addressee. Since the state's interest in
using the fighting words doctrine is to preserve the peace, its interest
diminishes proportionately as the likelihood of a breach of the peace
diminishes. The characteristics of the individual addressee thus become
important. As pointed out by Justice Powell in his concurrence in Lewis v.
New Orleans,'57 the fact that an addressee is a police officer is significant.
149. It is significant that the majority of cases in which a fighting words challenge has reached the
United States Supreme Court originated with speech involving religious or political matters. See, e.g.,
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New
Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma,408 U.S. 914 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). The potential for censorship is even more clearly
illustrated by cases in which a fighting words argument was spuriously advanced. In Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), blacks were peacefully demonstrating for their civil rights. The Court
found that "I am proud to be a Negro" and "Down with segregation" are not fightingwords. Id. at231,
236. In Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), the Court stated in a footnote that the fightingwords
doctrine does not apply to peaceful demonstrations. Id. at 564. See also Bachellar v. Maryland, 397
U.S. 564 (1970).
150. In Chaplinsky, the Court took judicial notice of how an average person would react. 315
U.S. at 573. The permissibility of this practice is highly questionable in view of the potential for abuse
that it allows. Judges are human and just as likely to be prejudiced as other persons.
151. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 527. See also Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (965).
152. See text accompanying notes 115 and 116 supra.
153. 405 U.S. 518.
154. Id. at 528.
155. Id. at 525.
156. Id. at 525-26, quoting Elmore v. State, 15 Ga. App. 461, 83 S.E. 799 (1914).
157. 408 U.S. 913.
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Even if an average person would be likely to fight in response to certain
words in a particular situation, a police officer is "trained to exercise a
higher degree of restraint.'
158
The state's valid interest in preventing breaches of the peace has long
been recognized and upheld in the application of the fighting words
doctrine. This interest must be weighed carefully, and the fighting words
doctrine construed narrowly in order to avoid infringing first amendment
rights. The Court's requirements that "breach of the peace" be narrowly
defined and that there must be a real likelihood of violent reaction by the
actual addressee comport with the need to guard carefully against broad
exceptions to the constitutional protection of speech.
The previous discussion demonstrates that the fighting words
doctrine has changed from a concept of a static class of words always
unprotected by the first amendment to a concept that requires case-by-case
determination based on a number of interrelated factors. In every fighting
words case, the court must determine (1) that the speech at issue would
tend to incite the average addressee to violence, (2) that the actual
addressee was so incited, (3) that circumstances were such that a breach of
the peace could have occurred, and (4) that the speech does not have a
value that merits constitutional protection. The Ohio Supreme Court
failed to consider these factors in reaching its decision in State v. Phipps.
III. Analysis of Phipps
A. Vagueness
In Phipps, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's
decision that Ohio Revised Code section 2907.07(B) is unconstitutionally
vague and found the statute to be clearly and precisely written.159 To
support this finding, the court purported to demonstrate that each of the
operative words of the statute is clearly defined in the Ohio Revised Code,
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, or Black's Law Dic-
tionary.
Despite this weighty authority, the court failed in its demonstration
that the statute is not vague. As previously noted, vagueness in first
amendment cases does not necessarily produce a lack of notice. It can
produce too much notice, which results in a chilling of first amendment
rights. 160 The court used the following definition of "offensive"-"that
which is disagreeable or nauseating or painful because of outrage to taste
and sensibilities or affronting insultingness," and that which "calls forth a
determination to resist or rebel." 16' This definition gives too much notice
158. Id. One of the duties of the police is to keep the peace. Citizens have a right to expect them
not to breach this duty in response to offensive language. Offensive language, regardless of its nature,
should never be "likely" to cause a retaliatory breach of the peace when it is addressed to a police officer.
159. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 274, 389 N.E.2d at 1131.
160. For an explication of the vagueness doctrine, see text accompanying notes 47-59 supra.
161. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 274, 389 N.E.2d at 1131. The effect of this definition in terms of the
statute's overbreadth will be dealt with in the next section.
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because it proscribes speech that obviously cannot be prohibited under the
Constitution and fails to specify what speech is prohibited.
162
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that speech
which is merely disagreeable or even that "creates dissatisfaction . . . or
even stirs people to anger"'163 cannot be constitutionally proscribed. Yet,
the definition used by the Ohio Supreme Court in Phipps results in the
prohibition of such speech. Simply because the meaning of "offensive"
may be clear does not dispel the chilling effect of Ohio Revised Code
section 2907.07(B). Anyone attempting to comply with the statute would
have to avoid the use of protected speech.
In addition to being vague for giving too much notice, the statute is
vague because it sets no standard of conduct. Even if the court's definition
of "offensive" is accurate, the statute fails to set a guideline to determine
when a person has become reckless in regard to offending the sensibilities
of another.164 Compliance with the statute as written would require that
language used in establishing same-sex contacts be palatable to the most
homophobic members of society. Such a rigid standard for the
proscription of speech has been held unacceptable by the United States
Supreme Court.1
65
Ohio's importuning statute is directed mainly at the proscription of
speech. 66 Because there is no class of words that will always be fighting
words, any statute directed at speech is unconstitutionally vague even if
construed to apply only to fighting words. This is so because language must
be determined to be fighting words on a case-by-case basis. 67 Because
these factual determinations must be made case-by-case, a statute directed
at speech could never overcome the problem of unconstitutional
vagueness. Adequate notice of the speech proscribed could never be
given. 1
68
The only constitutionally permissible use of the fighting words
doctrine is as a test for determining whether particular language violates a
statute directed at conduct other than speech. 169 For instance, if the basis
of a prosecution under a disorderly conduct statute is that language used
162. L. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-28 at 719.
163. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
164. In Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), the Court held that a statute prohibiting
conduct "annoying to others was vague because it failed to state upon whose sensitivity the
determination of annoyance would depend. Id. at 613-14. The Court said that such a statute is vague
because "no standard of conduct is specified at all." Id. at 614.
165. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966);
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
166. State v. Phipps, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 276; 389 N.E.2d 1123. The court stated: "R.C. 2907.07(B),
on its face . . . proscribes speech."
167. L. TRIBE, supra note 31, § 12-26 at 715.
168. Id. at 716.
169. By making the focus of the statute conduct ratherthan speech, case-by-case determinations
are permissible even when constitutionally protected speech may be incidentally infringed. Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
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elicited a violent response on the part of the addressee, the defendant can
be convicted only if his language meets this test for fighting words. Ohio's
statute fails to meet these standards and so should have been found
unconstitutionally vague.
B. Overbreadth
The Ohio Supreme Court correctly held that Ohio's importuning
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad 170 because it prohibits speech
protected by the first amendment.'17  In order to cure the statute's
overbreadth, the court attempted to give it a narrow construction by
making it applicable to fighting words only. The court failed in this attempt
for two reasons: first, it defined the word "offensive" so that the statute still
proscribed protected speech;17 2 and second, it applied the fighting words
doctrine in a manner that prohibits speech protected by the first
amendment.
73
C. The Fighting Words Doctrine
In attempting to narrow Ohio's importuning statute to apply only to
fighting words, the court failed objectly. It relied on the definition of
fighting words in Chaplinsky without incorporating any of the changes
that have occurred during the intervening years. 174 In Phipps, the court
applied the fighting words doctrine to offensive speech that harms only
sensibilities, despite the United States Supreme Court's rejection of
protection of sensibilities as a valid state interest under the fighting words
doctrine. In addition, the court applied the behavioral assumption-that
fighting words trigger a violent reaction on the part of the addressee-to
speech that has not been shown to be likely to provoke a violent reaction.
The Chaplinsky definition of fighting words recognized two state
interests in the proscription of such speech-an interest in preventing
breaches of the peace, and an interest in protecting the sensibilities of the
recipients of the offensive language.77 The interest in the protection of
sensibilities has been eliminated as an acceptable basis for the proscription
of fighting words. The only interest noted in the Chaplinsky formulation
that is viable today is the state's interest in preserving the peace. 76 The
Ohio Supreme Court did use the state's interest in preserving the peace as
one basis for its decision. It stated that same-sex solicitations are "as a
170. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 278, 389 N.E.2d at 1133.
171. Id.
172. See text accompanying notes 159-63 supra. The overbreadth in the cdurt's definition of
"offensive" arises from the proscription ofconstitutionally protected speech. The vagueness arises from
the definition's failure to draw lines between protected and unprotected offensive language.
173. See text accompanying notes 79-89 supra.
174. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 278, 389 N.E.2d 1133-34.
175. See text accompanying notes 69-78 and 112-16 supra for an explanation of the state's
interests under the fighting words doctrine.
176. See text accompanying notes 145-58 supra.
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matter of common knowledge, often likely to provoke violent reaction.''77
The bulk of the court's discussion of fighting words, however,
emphasizes the protection of sensibilities as the basis for upholding the
statute. The court relied heavily on Justice Powell's dissent in Rosenfeld,'78
which argued for continued use of the sensibilities interest as part of the
fighting words doctrine. Noting that Powell felt that "grossly offensive and
emotionally disturbing" language should be prohibited as a public
nuisance even if it did not constitute fighting words, 179 the court stated,
"[s]imilarly, we feel that solicitations of the type proscribed by the statute
are often 'grossly offensive and emotionally disturbing.' They are...
likely to cause injury in . .. [an] emotional sense .. .the shock to
one's sensibilities [may result] in injury to one's mind and spirit." 80
The serious infringement of constitutional rights effected by the
majority was recognized by Justice Sweeney in his dissent. Sweeney
remarked that the majority was equating offensive language with fighting
words and by doing so was dangerously narrowing first amendment
freedoms.18" ' By using the sensibilities interest as the basis for the statute,
the court necessarily kept the statute overbroad. Under the majority's
interpretation of the fighting words doctrine, constitutionally protected
activity is prohibited. 182 This interpretation is in clear contradiction to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Gooding'83 and subsequent
cases. 184
The behavioral assumption underlying the fighting words doctrine
applies only in situations in which personally abusive epithets are used in a
face-to-face confrontation.'" Ohio's same-sex solicitation statute was not
drafted to cover that type of situation. It deals with solicitations-the
asking or proposing of an activity-not with situations in which insults are
being hurled. One sincerely interested in having a sexual encounter would
not try to achieve that goal by addressing his prospective partner with
personally abusive insults or epithets. This is clearly illustrated by the facts
of the instant case. Phipps told the officer he solicited that he was
"handsome" and "beautiful" and that "he really liked him." 186 These
statements are not insults.
177. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 278,389 N.E.2d at 1134. The court also noted the Technical Committee's
comment to § 2907.07(B) that the rationale for prohibiting homosexual solicitations included the
consideration that "there is a risk that ... [the solicitation] may provoke a violent response"
Id. at 279, 389 N.E.2d at 1134 (quoting the Committee Comment).
178. 408 U.S. at 902.
179. Id. at 906.
180. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 279, 389 N.E.2d at 1134.
181. Id. at 281, 389 N.E.2d at 1135.
182. For a discussion of overbreadth, see text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
183. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
184. Karlan v. Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924 (1974); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972);
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
185. See text accompanying notes 75-89 supra for a discussion of the behavioral assumption
underlying the fighting words doctrine.
186. Record at 10-11.
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To make the behavioral assumption valid, Gooding, it will be
recalled, added a requirement that there be a real possibility that the
addressee will react violently.187 The court in Phipps never addressed this
issue. Phipps' remarks were made to a police officer working in the vice
department.188 As previously discussed, 189 it is questionable whether an
officer on duty should ever be offended to the point of being likely to react
with violence. But when, as in the present case, the officer was on vice duty
and admittedly had heard the words used by Phipps before, 190 it is
ridiculous to apply the fighting words rationale. As part of his job, the
officer had put himself in a situation in which he was likely to hear such
language. If under these circumstances the officer could be offended to the
point of reacting violently by Phipps' words, the problem is with the officer
and not with Phipps.
In applying the fighting words doctrine, speech can be prohibited only
if it would have a tendency to cause an average person to react violently.191
The court found in Phipps that, as a matter of common knowledge,
homosexual solicitations meet the average person standard. 192 Available
statistics, however, are to the contrary.
In 1949 Alfred Kinsey reported that fifty percent of the male
population of the United States had experienced some form of
homosexual activity in their lives. 193 This activity ranged from repeated
and exclusive sexual conduct to erotic reactions to homosexual stimuli.
194
The corresponding figure for women is 28%. 19' Kinsey asked only women
whether or not they approved homosexual conduct for others. The
response indicated that 23% approved and 63% were undecided. 196 These
figures indicate that 85% of the female population did not have specific
predetermined notions that homosexual activity is per se "bad." This
assertion, combined with the fact that one out of two men has had some
form of homosexual experience, 197 indicates that the court's assertion that
the "average person" would be offended to the point of violent reaction by
a homosexual solicitation is wrong.
Kinsey's statistics refute the Ohio Supreme Court's bald assertion that
the average person would react violently to a sexual solicitation from a
person of the same sex. The statute requires either knowledge that the
187. See text accompanying notes 153-56 supra.
188. Record at 9.
189. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
190. Record at 11-12.
191. See text accompanying notes 86-89, 100-07, and 146-50 supra.
192. 59 Ohio St. 2d at 278, 389 N.E.2d at 1134.
193. A. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 650 (1948).
194. Id.
195. A. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 148 (1974).
196. Id. at 501. No standard for determining who or what is the "average" person has been set,
yet Kinsey's statistics clearly are persuasive, at least to the point of demonstrating what is not the
average.
197. A. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 650 (1948).
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person solicited will be offended or recklessness in regard to the offense
that a solicitation will cause. The Ohio Revised Code states that a person
acts knowingly "when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a
certain result."'198 Under the Code, a person acts recklessly when "he
perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a
certain result."' 99 The Ohio Legislative Service Commission defines
"likely" as "when there is merely good reason for expectation or belief."200
Kinsey's statistics indicate that it is probable that a person solicited will not
be offended to the point of violent response.
In reaching its decision in Phipps, the court failed to ascertain whether
or not the addressee of Phipps' words was offended to the point of reacting
violently. The court also neglected to determine whether an average person
would have reacted with violence in the same situation. In addition, the
court applied the fighting words doctrine to words far different from the
abusive epithets commonly recognized as fighting words. In short, the
court was trying to fit a round peg into a square hole.
Conclusion
The Ohio Supreme Court in its decision in Phipps relied on an
outdated concept of the fighting words doctrine. It failed to recognize the
narrowed application of that doctrine adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in recent years.
The court in Phipps has carved out a substantial exception to first
amendment protections in its attempt to prohibit speech it considers of-
fensive. This poorly reasoned decision clearly demonstrates the court's
prejudice against homosexual lifestyles. 20 1 The courts attempt to expand
the fighting words doctrine to prohibit same-sex solicitations needs serious
reconsideration.
Ohio Revised Code section 2907.07(B), as interpreted by the court in
Phipps, prohibits constitutionally protected speech. This is in intolerable
situation that demands immediate correction, if not by the court, then by
the legislature. Both would do well to recall the nursery rhyme so often
recited by quarreling children:
Sticks and stones
May break my bones
But words will never hurt me.
S. Adele Shank
198. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C) (Page 1975).
199. Id.
200. Legislative Serv. Comm'n Note to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22 (Page 1975).
201. See State v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 113, 313 N.E.2d 847, 848 (1974), in which the court
said that "the promotion of homosexuality as a valid lifestyle is contrary to the public policy of this
state."
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